Review Staff: 75/2608
25 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: HSC Briefing-Kirschstein

1. HSC Staffer Fred Kirschstein was briefed by
Ed Proctor for two hours on 18 August. Kirschstein
initially asked in general terms what the DDI did and
doubted that he had ever seen a CIA publication. This
almost brought the briefing to kindergarten level but
there was a quick recovery from this false start.

2. Kirschstein said his area of assignment was
to uncover overlap, duplication and waste in the IC
technical collection area. Proctor said that this was
not a particularly fruitful path to follow because
most of the obvious cases had been taken care of.
Kirschstein agreed that he might better study the
relative importance of material being collected, and
the allocation of resources among collectors, proces-
sors and producers. Proctor suggested that Kirschstein
examine whether the machinery for assuring the
effective use and allocation of resources, and manage-
ment procedures, responsibilities and arrangements,
were the best that could be devised. He noted that
ACSI and the IC Staff were working on this, and
suggested that Kirschstein talk further with General
Sam Wilson.

3. Kirschstein was intrigued with the subject of
DCI control of the intelligence community. Proctor
noted that the DCI had the responsibility to recommend
but no authority to command, and pointed out that some
80% of IC resources were controlled by the DOD.
Control could not be exercised solely through the
budget, however, since the military services had a
broad congressional, popular, and industrial con-
stituency and thus considerable bureaucratic clout while
the DCI had a narrow constituency of users.

4. The importance of a DCI's personality and his stature independent of his position were also examined. Kirschstein felt that the statutory authority of the DCI should be increased, and that more cognizance had to be given to the personal qualities of any DCI, for example, whether he had independent stature among business or political circles.

5. Kirschstein wondered how the DCI would rechannel resources if he had more authority to do so. Proctor observed that military intelligence· requirements were derived from statements of mission of military commanders. These were probably too demanding and needed to take political realities more into account. Rechanneling could be accomplished by taking some cryptological col-lection budgets out of the DOD--those for NSA and the cryptological collection agencies in particular. One question was whether collection by military personnel in the field was the most economical route. Military manning is a result of the historical origins of the cryptological effort and is partly justified on the concept that the military services were obliged to be prepared for war. This approach inevitably required a lot of training due to the very high rate of turnover in the military. Kirschstein thought this would be an extremely hard recommendation to implement. Proctor rejoined that all the easy decisions had been made.

6. Kirschstein asked how NSA should be changed. Proctor replied that NSA might be collecting further down the priority list of requirements while many requirements high on the list of political and economic information were/not even attempted. It was a matter of military orientation of CCP managers and personnel. Economic intelligence was an area in which NSA might have a capacity to collect, but some of its potential was still unknown. This, of course, would require a more judgmental approach in field collection, and a different type of collector.

7. Kirschstein was concerned that the U.S. military perception of the requirements of U.S. forces was based solely on a perception of the Soviet military capability.

He felt there had to be more political intelligence input as a balancing factor, and wondered how much influence INR and CIA were able to exert on assessments of the Soviet threat.

8. Kirschstein repeatedly focused on the military intelligence agencies. What proportion of information collected by DOD was relevant to international political analysis? How much political information came from Attaches? How much political information came from NSA? What was the bulk of NSA reporting? ⸱ [   ] was there good cooperation with NSA? How useful was Army clandestine collection?

9. Kirschstein assumed that the bulk of technical collection would be to derive order-of-battle information. He felt this inevitably begot duplication. Proctor explained the different requirements of the various users, noted that the need for speed of reporting differed, and that duplication often provided confirmation. Kirschstein observed that the great bulk of the military intelligence budget was consumed by tactical collection efforts. Proctor reminded him of the merging of strategical and tactical intelligence in crisis situations.

10. Kirschstein also questioned CIA practices. Did the CIA prioritize its use of resources, or in the main did it place its resources where it obtained successful results? As an example of the latter, he cited Agee's reference to [   ]

11. He also questioned duplication in the field of technical analysis. For example, telemetry seemed to be collected by competing organizations.

12. He was shocked that only six percent of the CIA budget was spent on analysis. This meant we were either collecting too much, that we had too few analysts, or that our analysts were simply overworked. Proctor agreed that we might be collecting too far down the line in some areas. We didn't need to put more resources on producing facts; we did need to put more resources on producing analysis for understanding the implications of the facts and for revealing trends.

13. Kirschstein wondered if there was adequate cooperation between the DDO and the DDI so that analysts could be alerted to pending covert actions that would effect their assessments of future events in any area. Proctor pointed out that this cooperation now existed, but that this had not always been the case.

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cc: SC/DCI
    Task Force Members

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